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Abstract:With deeper study of the Game Theory, some conditions of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is no longer suitable of games in real life. So we try to develop a new 
model-Villager’s Dilemma which has more realistic conditions to stimulate the process 
of game. It is emphasize that Prisoner’s Dilemma is an exception which is lack of 
universality and the importance of rules in the game. And it puts forward that to let the 
rule maker take part in the game and specifies game players can stop the game as they 
like. 
This essay describes the basic model, the villager’s dilemma (VD) and put some 
extended use of it, and points out the importance of rules and the effect it has on the 
result of the game. It briefly describes the disadvantage of Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
advantage Villager’s Dilemma has. It summarizes the premise and scope of application 
of Villager’s Dilemma, and provides theory foundation for making rules for game and 
forecast of the future of the game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Basic Model 
In the basic model, the villager’s dilemma (VD) is presented as follows: 
Three villagers who have the same physical strength and a robber who has two and a 
half times physical strength as three villagers are living in the same village. In other 
words, three villagers has to act together to defeat the robber who is stronger than 
anyone of them. 
Generally, each villager has 5 bags of grain produced, and they have to suffer from 
depredation of the robber every year. 
The robber follows the rule that he will take away three bags of grain from every 
villager per year in ordinary conditions. However, the villager who defies or resists 
the robber will be despoiled of all the production, and the villager who betrays the 
other two villagers who prefer to betray and acts as an accomplice will be rewarded 
of two bags of grain without any loss. If there are two betrayers, then each of them 
will be given one bag of grain.  
It is known that three villagers can communicate freely without being held back by 
the robber.  
If villagers prefer to defy or resist the robber just once, in other words, they choose 
to defeat the robber together, and then they will play the game repeatedly. And if 
the game is unavoidable, the game will become a game played between villagers and 
the village chief, which is an extended model detailed in Chapter Two. 
 Villager A  
& Villagers B 
Defy 
Villager A  
& Villagers B 
obey 
Villager A  
Defies, 
Villagers B 
Betrays 
Villager A  
Betrays, 
Villagers B 
Defies 
Defy 5 bags of grain  
 
0 bags of grain  
 
0 bags of grain  
 
0 bags of grain  
 
Obey 2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
Betray 7 bags of grain  
 
 7 bags of grain  
 
7 bags of grain  
 
Table1. Strategy for Villager C in Villager’s Dilemma. (Assuming that each villager is 
rational) 
In Villager’s Dilemma, three villagers represent game players of three parties. And 
the robber stands for the rule maker. Villagers are free to choose their own 
strategies. Meanwhile, the robber is able to make rules as he likes. This model is 
similar to the prisoner’s dilemma at some point, while it is more approach to the real 
situation. We will discuss this in Chapter Four. 
Compared with other dilemma theory, we also assume that there are no reputaton 
effects from the villager’s decision. And the only concern of each player (villager) is 
maximizing his/her own payoff, without concern for the other player’s payoff. The 
unique equilibrium for this game is a Pareto-suboptimal solution-that is, rational 
choice leads the two players to both play defect even each player’s individual reward 
would be greater if they both played cooperatively.    
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Which strategy does a villager should to choose if they want to minimize his/her own 
loss and maximize payoff?  
In this game, given that three villagers communicate with each other to defy before 
robber’s coming, one of them will consider, if I choose the strategy to defy, then the 
optimal strategy for the other two is to betray. Then I will lose all my production 
because of my defiance. However, if I choose to help the robber, no matter what the 
other villager does, it will be better than defy. So that, betray and acts as an 
accomplice is the optimal strategy. 
It is clear that three villagers are confront with the same reality, and each of them 
will arrive at the conclusion that to betray and acts as an accomplice is the optimal 
strategy based on rational pondering. That is to say the Subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium is all the three villagers obey and become accomplice of the robber. 
Under this circumstance, each villager loses three bags of grain, while robber gets 
the maximum payoff.  
Nash equilibrium of the game above is evidently not the Pareto Optimum. 
Concerning of the payoff of the three villagers as whole, if all of them choose to defy 
and defeat the robber, they will remain all their production—five bags of grain per 
person, which is a better payoff for them, other than betray in which there is just 
two bags of grain remained for each person. But based on the hypothesis, the three 
rational individuals concern of each own payoff without other’s. Equilibrium of this 
game is three villagers choose the same strategy to obey, then payoff for each one is 
better than defy, but payoff for the whole is low. It’s what is called ‘dilemma’. 
 
2. Extended model. 
2.1 Result of Game Given that Abolish the Reward rule. 
Let’s omit the rule that ‘ the villager who betrays the other two villagers who prefer 
to betray and acts as an accomplice will be rewarded of two bags of grain without 
any loss’. Then we will get the result as following: 
 Villager A  
& Villagers B 
Defy 
Villager A  
Obeys, 
Villagers B 
defies 
Villager A  
& Villagers B 
obey 
Defy 5 bags of grain  
 
0 bags of grain  
 
0 bags of grain  
 
Obey 2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
Betray 2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
Table2. Strategy for Villager C in Villager’s Dilemma. (Assuming that each villager is 
rational) 
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At this time, the Nash equilibrium alters: three villagers will choose the strategy of 
defying after communicating. And the Nash Equilibrium and the Pareto Optimum 
arrive at the same point. 
2.2 Result of Game Given that Abolish the Punishment rule. 
We have found that the result of the game alters if we omit the reward rule. Then if 
we omit the punishment rule, what will happen? 
 Villager A  
& Villagers B 
Defy 
Villager A  
& Villagers B 
obey 
Villager A  
Defies, 
Villagers B 
Betrays 
Villager A  
Betrays, 
Villagers B 
obeys 
Defy 5 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
Obey 2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
2 bags of grain  
 
Betray 7 bags of grain  
 
 6 bags of grain  
 
7 bags of grain  
 
Table2. Strategy for Villager C in Villager’s Dilemma. (Assuming that each villager is 
rational) 
The most remarkable phenomenon of this strategy is that the optimal strategy is to 
defy without communication among them, by reason that the act of betrayal and the 
act of defiance must occur together. Payoff will be reduced if one chooses to obey, 
while it will be increased if chooses to defy. 
At the same time, we found that after communication, the result is not the same as 
before at all. Thus, three villagers will regard betray as the optimal strategy for 
individual! It is sure that every rational individual will not communicate with each 
other in advance to make other known his/her option, since the betray strategy is on 
the basis of knowing others will defy. However, we know that defy is the optimal 
strategy without communication.   
Under the circumstance it is not possible to attain a table result. Therefore, we are 
sure to found defying is the optimal strategy after communication in the repeated 
game in long-run.     
Why result of the extended model does not correspond with Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
The reason is that we omit the rule of reward and punishment, which actually alters 
the final result.   
The reward and punishment system is used to encourage game players to choose 
the strategy which the rule maker wishes them to choose other than strategies 
which is prohibited. At this point, there’re obvious differences occur between the 
game players and the rule maker: 
1. If there is reward, player will choose to ‘betray and act as accomplice’. 
2. If there is neither reward nor punishment, player will choose to ‘obey’. 
3. If there is punishment, player will choose to ‘betray and act as accomplice’. 
We have found that, if only the robber make rules which are easy enough to be 
distinguished, Nash Equilibrium of the Prisoner’s Dilemma will be achieved. It is 
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evidentially that Villager’s Dilemma is a special case of Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Furthermore, a number of conditions, such as prisoners cannot communicate with 
each other, rule maker will not be affected by the game players, the rule will stay the 
same are more and more inadaptable to the society.  
2.3 Repercussion the alteration of rule will have on Villager’s 
Dilemma 
If we define the rule maker as boss other than robber, and use the profit made by 
employees, payment for boss and welfare for employees to replace the grain, then 
the game will have a fundamental change. Under this circumstance, rational game 
player and rule maker will concern of how to realize the profit maximization for 
collectivity instead of individuals. 
At this moment, rule maker and game players have changed their moods. To be 
more precise, it means that boss has to provide high payment and proper welfare for 
employees to prevent their job-hoping because it is necessary to employees. And the 
boss will set rules as following: 
If you do a bad job, then you will get less payment. 
If you do an average job, then you will get the basic payment. 
If you do a good job, then you will get extra payment. 
Above is a simple model of modern corporation system. From this model we can see 
that you will never get rid of bosses’ restraint. And you have no choice but to bargain 
with your boss or move to a better job. In addition, this game is doomed to be 
played repeatedly in your career. 
In this game, everyone should not just concern of himself or herself. We all know 
that if the boss pays a low payment, then he will suffer from employees’ 
job-hopping. And if an employee asks for a very high payment, he will be fired as 
well, or else, the corporation will be shut up for the too heavy income burden. To 
sum up, result of seeking personal interests is the loss of all the people’s good.   
It is predicable that an equilibrium of the game between boss and employees will be 
arrived with the more games played, and a mutual benefit system will be 
established.   
In order to make the game continued, boss ought to hew to the rule: 
Rules must be worked out reasonably, and there are significant differences between 
reward and punishment.  
It is notable that it is required to set rules which have marked differences. First, it is 
necessary to estimate and analyze game players in all aspects in order to prevent 
errors in setting differences. For example, there is no difference to villagers that the 
robber robs three bags or all production of villagers if villagers need three gags of 
grain to survive. And at this time, the optimal strategy can not be anything but 
defiance. It is the same in corporate management, we have to set wage standard 
based on local general level of market price. 
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3. Examples and disadvantages of Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Before talking about the usage of Villager’s Dilemma in real-life, let’s review the 
classic form of Prisoner’s Dilemma in Game Theory. 
The following part is quoted from Wikipedia:  
The Prisoner's Dilemma constitutes a problem in game theory. It was originally framed 
by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher working at RAND in 1950. Albert W. Tucker formalized 
the game with prison sentence payoffs and gave it the "Prisoner's Dilemma" name 
(Poundstone, 1992). 
In its classical form, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is presented as follows: 
Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a 
conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same 
deal. If one testifies (defects) for the prosecution against the other and the other 
remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 
10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six 
months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year 
sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one 
is assured that the other would not know about the betrayal before the end of the 
investigation. How should the prisoners act?  
If we assume that each player prefers shorter sentences to longer ones, and that 
each gets no utility out of lowering the other player's sentence, and that there are no 
reputation effects from a player's decision, then the prisoner's dilemma forms a 
non-zero-sum game in which two players may each cooperate with or defect from (i.e., 
betray) the other player. In this game, as in all game theory, the only concern of each 
individual player (prisoner) is maximizing his/her own payoff, without any concern for 
the other player's payoff. The unique equilibrium for this game is a Pareto-suboptimal 
solution—that is, rational choice leads the two players to both play defects even 
though each player's individual reward would be greater if they both played 
cooperatively. 
In the classic form of this game, cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting, so that 
the only possible equilibrium for the game is for all players to defect. No matter what 
the other player does, one player will always gain a greater payoff by playing defect. 
Since in any situation playing defect is more beneficial than cooperating, all rational 
players will play defect, all things being equal. 
In the iterated prisoner's dilemma the game is played repeatedly. Thus each player has 
an opportunity to punish the other player for previous non-cooperative play. If the 
number of steps is known by both players in advance, economic theory says that the 
two players should defect again and again; no matter how many times the game is 
played. Only when the players play an indefinite or random number of times can 
cooperation be an economic equilibrium. In this case, the incentive to defect can be 
overcome by the threat of punishment. When the game is infinitely repeated, 
cooperation may be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium although both players’ defecting 
always remains equilibrium and there are many other equilibrium outcomes. 
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In casual usage, the label "prisoner's dilemma" may be applied to situations not 
strictly matching the formal criteria of the classic or iterative games; for instance, 
those in which two entities could gain important benefits from cooperating or suffer 
from the failure to do so, but find it merely difficult or expensive, not necessarily 
impossible, to coordinate their activities to achieve cooperation. 
The classical prisoner's dilemma can be summarized thus: 
 Prisoner B Stays Silent Prisoner B Betrays 
Prisoner A Stays Silent Each serves 6 months 
Prisoner A: 10 years 
Prisoner B: goes free 
Prisoner A Betrays 
Prisoner A: goes free 
Prisoner B: 10 years 
Each serves 5 years 
In this game, regardless of what the opponent chooses, each player always receives a 
higher payoff (lesser sentence) by betraying; that is to say that betraying is the 
strictly dominant strategy. For instance, Prisoner A can accurately say, "No matter 
what Prisoner B does, I personally am better off betraying than staying silent. 
Therefore, for my own sake, I should betray." However, if the other player acts 
similarly, then they both betray and both get a lower payoff than they would get by 
staying silent. Rational self-interested decisions result in each prisoner's being worse 
off than if each chose to lessen the sentence of the accomplice at the cost of staying 
a little longer in jail him. Hence it is a seeming dilemma. In game theory, this 
demonstrates very elegantly that in a non-zero sum game a Nash Equilibrium need not be a 
Pareto optimum. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma has been quoted for many times, ‘in a non-zero sum game a Nash 
Equilibrium need not be a Pareto optimum’ is regarded as philosophy by people. But we 
also find some problem which cannot be explained by Prisoner’s Dilemma with 
deeper exploration.[1]  
Let’s analyze two examples below: 
Case 1 
William Poundstone, in a book about the Prisoner's Dilemma (see References below), 
describes a situation in New Zealand where newspaper boxes are left unlocked. It is 
possible for people to take a paper without paying (defecting) but very few do, 
feeling that if they do not pay then neither will others, destroying the system. 
Because there is no mechanism for personal choice to influence others' decisions, this 
type of thinking relies on correlations between behaviors, not on causation. Because 
of this property, those who do not understand superrationality often mistake it for 
magical thinking. Without superrationality, not only petty theft, but voluntary voting 
requires widespread magical thinking, since a non-voter is a free rider on a 
democratic system. [2] 
Case 2 
When cigarette advertising was legal in the United States, competing cigarette 
manufacturers had to decide how much money to spend on advertising. The 
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effectiveness of Firm A’s advertising was partially determined by the advertising 
conducted by Firm B. Likewise, the profit derived from advertising for Firm B is 
affected by the advertising conducted by Firm A. If both Firm A and Firm B chose to 
advertise during a given period the advertising cancels out, receipts remain constant, 
and expenses increase due to the cost of advertising. Both firms would benefit from a 
reduction in advertising. However, should Firm B choose not to advertise, Firm A 
could benefit greatly by advertising. Nevertheless, the optimal amount of advertising 
by one firm depends on how much advertising the other undertakes. As the best 
strategy is dependent on what the other firm chooses there is no dominant strategy 
and this is not a prisoner's dilemma but rather is an example of a stag hunt. The 
outcome is similar, though, in that both firms would be better off were they to 
advertise less than in the equilibrium. Sometimes cooperative behaviors do emerge in 
business situations. For instance, cigarette manufacturers endorsed the creation of 
laws banning cigarette advertising, understanding that this would reduce costs and 
increase profits across the industry. This analysis is likely to be pertinent in many 
other business situations involving advertising. [3] 
Analysis of cases  
For case one, let’s talk about it together with some real fact: 
Modern media corporation always use advertising strategy as profit mode rather 
than the sale of newspapers. And we find more and more newspapers begin to 
decrease the price of a single newspaper, even deliver newspapers freely in order to 
make a high price on the basis of a high broad reach.  
In New Zealand, the credit history is very demanding. Once there is a stain in the 
credit history, it is difficult for one to do anything smoothly. 
From A we find that payoff is quite low and even can be ignored if we choose betray. 
However, from B it is clear that punishment is very painful for anyone. In Villager’s 
Dilemma, it is can be described as changing the conditions in the game, making the 
mode as following: 
 Prisoner B Stays Silent Prisoner B Betrays 
Prisoner A Stays Silent Each serves 10 months 
Prisoner A: 2 years 
Prisoner B: 5 years 
Prisoner A Betrays 
Prisoner A: 5 years 
Prisoner B: 2 years 
Each serves 10 years 
 
Now both parties choose to collaborate, and the game reaches Nash Equilibrium. 
This result has disproved the deduction that ‘in a non-zero sum game a Nash Equilibrium 
need not be a Pareto optimum’.How did the wrong deduction be produced? The result 
is that Prisoner’s exclude rules in the game. Actually, rules will have significant effect 
on the result of the game.   
Case two has improved that rules will have significant effect on the result of the 
game with real-world example. And we have to remember that the rule has to be 
efficient rather then something useless.  
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Let’s discuss two questions: 
Replace the newspapers in Case One with a Lamborghini of the latest version. 
Replace the laws in Case Two with Intra-industry agreements. 
Results: 
Cannot be reach collaboration because payoff of betray is extremely large. 
Cannot be reach collaboration because punishment is not available when 
Intra-industry agreements exist. 
These results can be found in real life. And it pointed out that Prisoner’s Dilemma 
has an obviously problem: 
Prisoner’s Dilemma has set fixed rules with distinguishing reward and punishment, 
but it is exception in real life. Prisoner’s Dilemma overlook the importance of rules 
and effect rules have on the result of games, only considered strategies chosen by 
game players. 
 
Why do some corporation choose betray which is at high risk and may be punished 
by Opponent rivals? We know that demand in a given period is constant. For 
example, the more the people to divide a pie, the less amount everyone will get. On 
the contrary, the less the people to divide a pie, the more amount everyone will get. 
That is to say, with increase of the game players, payoff will be also rise for 
everyone, and finally make game players tend to choose betraying. It is more 
appropriate in the real word, but payoff is fixed for every game player in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma disagree with the situation in real life.  
4. Advantage of Villager’s Dilemma. 
The most significant advantage that Villager’s Dilemma has over Prisoner’s Dilemma 
is that it is more approach to the virtual reality. Specifically, we have found seven 
advantages: 
There’re distinguishable differences between strategies. Betray is segmented into 
two groups—Betray and act as accomplice which can be rewarded and obey which 
cannot get any rewards. 
The less the game layers, the more payoff will betrayer to attain. 
Game players are allowed to communicate with each other. 
Rule maker also takes part in allocation of benefit. 
Any participant of the game have right to stop the game. 
The model with three game players is easier to be used in the real-life with more 
than two parties in the game. 
Setting rules has vital effect on result of the game.  
 
5. Practical significance of the model of villager’s dilemma. 
Villager’s Dilemma is of interest to the Sociology, Politics, Management and 
Economics. 
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5.1 Result of the Game will be affected by the Rules.  
In Prisoner’s Dilemma, there’s doubt of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand Theory. Now, 
it’s high time to complete the conclusion. According to the demonstration above, we 
add one point to Adam Smith’s Theory.  
In the market economic with has distinguishable reward and punishment ,that is to 
say, one will be awarded  because of behaviors benefit the party, otherwise he or 
she will be punished because of behaviors harm the party, everyone will finally 
make the party’s benefit to the maximum based on the consideration of his or her 
own.  
Powerful rule maker make rules to affect game players’ decision, he tries to control 
the result—the invisible hand, that is the market economic by making rules—the 
visible hand, such as laws, regulations and policies.  
It should be pointed out that, rules must be effective, and consideration of reward 
and punishment must be in related to all game players.  
Rules which are ineffective include some examples below: 
1. Rules made by electronic appliance holding in private. 
2. Credit History without morality. 
3. Laws of the country in war. 
We have mentioned that rules must be effective, and consideration of reward and 
punishment must be in related to all game players. It means that if a person needs at 
least three bags of grain to survive, then the rule is not well present reward and 
punishment.  
The classical example is Case Two which tells that alter rules can affect result of 
game in an extremely extent. Besides this example, we can also find other case in 
the real life. 
5.2 Games which lack of Distinguishing Rules cannot be Played 
Smoothly.  
    A record from Wanxiang Cave, China, characterizes Asian Monsoon (AM) history 
over the past 1810 years. The summer monsoon correlates with solar variability, 
Northern Hemisphere and Chinese temperature, Alpine glacial retreat, and Chinese 
cultural changes. It was generally strong during Europe's Medieval Warm Period and 
weak during Europe's Little Ice Age, as well as during the final decades of the Tang, 
Yuan, and Ming Dynasties, all times that were characterized by popular unrest. It was 
strong during the first several decades of the Northern Song Dynasty, a period of 
increased rice cultivation and dramatic population increase. The sign of the 
correlation between the AM and temperature switches around 1960, suggesting that 
anthropogenic forcing superseded natural forcing as the major driver of AM changes 
in the late 20th century.[4] 
     
From this article we find that all dynasties are characterized by that natural calamity 
happened and lead to a general region of famine when one is week and dying. 
However, is that a dynasty will overthrow if only there’s famine? In the light of 
history, there were frequent natural disasters before West Han Dynasty. But because 
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emperors cared of people and the country, it weren’t cause the unrest of society, 
instead, it raised emperor’s reputation.  
Thus, what’s the common ground of dynasties’ decaying? The answer is political 
corruption.  
Let’s have a look at Villager’s Dilemma’s use in this case: 
Because of natural disaster’s, there was a bad harvest, every villager produced three 
bags of grain. However, officials are greedy, and pocketed food for victims, at the 
same time, put harsh duties on people, and took five bags of grain away from every 
people. 
In fact, villagers and robbers were not allowed to communicate with each other 
under the feudal system. Finally, villagers defied and ended up the game, so that the 
dynasty decayed. 
The Chinese Nation was considering the question: Why did people always suffer 
from bitter life either the country was strong or poor? Whereas America which was 
on the on the other side of the ocean established democratic system to get rid of the 
odd circle. In other words, American democratic system provided the channel for 
villagers and robber to communicate with each other, and robber was selected by 
villagers. Furthermore, villagers decay via voting rather than military force, which we 
called an peaceful and efficient way to resolve a contradiction. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Villager’s Dilemma is aimed at analyze how rules made by managers will affect the 
result of the game of managed game players. It emphasizes the importance of rules’ 
making. This mode provides explain and solutions of the current situation.  
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